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Abstract—Text-based passwords continue to be the prime
form of authentication to computer systems. Today, they are
increasingly created and used with mobile text entry methods,
such as touchscreens and mobile keyboards, in addition to tra-
ditional physical keyboards. This raises a foundational question
for usable security: whether text entry methods affect password
generation and password security. This paper presents results
from a between-group study with 63 participants, in which each
group generated passwords for multiple virtual accounts using a
different text entry method. Participants were also asked to recall
their passwords afterwards. We applied analysis of structures and
probabilities, with standard and recent security metrics and also
performed cracking attacks on the collected data. The results
show a significant effect of text entry methods on passwords. In
particular, one of the experimental groups created passwords with
significantly more lowercase letters per password than the control
group (t(60) = 2.99, p = 0.004). The choices for character types
in each group were also significantly different (p = 0.048, FET ).
Our cracking attacks consequently expose significantly different
resistance across groups (p = 0.031, FET ) and text entry method
vulnerabilities. Our findings contribute to the understanding of
password security in the context of usable interfaces.
I. INTRODUCTION
Text-based passwords remain as the most prevalent method
of authentication [1]. In addition to traditional computers such
desktops and laptops, people increasingly generate and use
passwords with a wide variety of mobile terminals, such as
tablets and smartphones. These mobile terminals have very
different text entry methods compared to traditional physical
keyboards available for desktops and laptops. Mobile terminals
are also replacing traditional computers in daily tasks. For
example, Pew Research estimates that 21% of all US adult cell
phone owners use primarily their phone to access the web [2].
In the present study, we examined whether the design of
text entry methods affect the security of generated passwords.
A text entry method [3] consists of those physical (e.g. form
factor, display, sensor, etc.) and software (e.g. virtual keyboard
layout) aspects of an input device that are relevant when
entering text. The design of a text entry method determines
how quickly and effortlessly a given character can be typed.
Even small changes in how characters are displayed and
organized can affect both typing performance [4] and visual
search [5]. Differences in selection time should be pronounced
for text entry methods with vastly different form factors, such
as a smartphone using a virtual keyboard versus a laptop with
a physical keyboard. Further, typing performance among entry
methods can differ remarkably: experienced typists on physical
keyboards reach more than 60 words per minute (wpm) [6],
whereas tablets and smartphones are in the range of 20 to 30
wpm [7], [8]. We hypothesized that differences in the design
of text entry method might affect password generation. Such
an effect would depend on whether users are mindful of such
design when they mentally generate password candidates. For
example, for numeric 4-digit automatic teller machine PIN
codes, it has been found that PINs are created to produce visual
patterns on the keygrid [9].
In particular, we hypothesized that, depending on password
generation strategy, entry methods can affect password security
in a few ways: users may generate passwords by using the
characters on the display as generation cues. More precisely,
the difficulty to reach a character from the present view should
affect the probability of its inclusion in a password. Consider
for example the fact that common laptop keyboard has 47
characters and common touchscreen qwerty keyboard has only
26 characters on the first screen. Not only do these entry
methods differ in the entry rate of single keys [10], [11],
they also most likely differ in the visual overhead of locating
keys. A common laptop keyboard shows each letter, number
or special character on the physical key. The user needs just
to press e.g. shift to access special characters. In contrast,
common virtual keyboards require users to first switch layouts
and then visually search in each layout to locate the desired
key. These differences could have prominence in the generated
password. One should also see corresponding differences in
the distribution of characters. For instance, numbers are not
directly reachable without changing the screen in the common
touchscreen qwerty keyboard on smartphones – does this affect
the generated passwords?
To better understand if an effect of text entry method design
occurs, we conducted a randomized controlled between-group
experimental study with 63 participants. The study allowed
us to compare passwords generated with different text entry
methods. We assigned participants into three groups, each of
which was provided a different text entry method we chose
purposefully. Participants were first asked to generate three
passwords for three clearly distinct virtual accounts (bank,
email, online magazine). They were then immediately tested
for their memory, and asked to do that again after at least 10
days. We chose three text entry methods that were different
from each other in several ways but still resemble the main
present-day platforms for text entry. Specifically, we chose the
text entry methods so that the difficulty of reaching different
keys increased in experimental groups compared to the control
group.
We found that the basic structures and distributions of
passwords were significantly different across groups. In par-
ticular, as the difficulty of reaching keys increased, partici-
pants chose characters from a smaller subset of characters
to construct passwords. As a result, the experimental group
with the most difficult method had much more passwords
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containing only lowercase letters compared to other groups.
However, to our surprise, passwords across groups seemed
to have similar scores when applied with standard password
strength metrics (entropy [12], [13], NIST entropy [14]) and
a recently introduced Markov-model-based metric (adaptive
password-strength meter [15]). However, we found that pass-
words across groups showed statistically significant different
resistance against password cracking attacks. This is important
for password security. In particular, when a vulnerability exists
in the password population for a text entry method, attackers
can use method-specific attacks. This could be possible for
example against sites that are known to be accessed mostly
by mobile terminals. Therefore, we conclude that text entry
methods affect password security. We believe our results
further motivate studies of password security in the context
of usable interfaces.
This paper makes following contributions:
1. Our results show that text entry methods affect the
security of user-generated passwords. Specifically, passwords
created with different methods show significant difference in
resistance against password cracking attacks.
2. Our results show that the text entry methods affect how
people compose their passwords. For example, participants
in experimental group two focused a small set of characters
compared to the experimental group one and the control group.
3. We report a comprehensive analysis of user-generated
passwords in laboratory settings. In particular, we confirm
previous research suggesting that entropy-based metrics should
not be used as indicators of password strength. The present
work also calls more attention to a recently proposed Markov-
model-based password strength meter [15], and in particular
its applicability to small-scale password dataset analysis.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we focus on what is known about how peo-
ple generate text-based passwords. For an overview of research
for the past twelve years on studies on graphical passwords, an
alternative method of authentication, we recommend a survey
by Biddle et al. [16].
Passwords have been used in computer systems since 1960s
[17], and have been studied and criticized since at least
1970s [18]. A case history of password security dates back
in 1979 [19]. Jakobsson et al. [20] have argued that we should
understand passwords better and block weak passwords.
Florencio et al. [21] studied people’s web password habits,
and found that people’s passwords were generally of poor
quality, they are re-used and forgotten frequently. Grawemeyer
[22] conducted a diary study to understand how people use
passwords, they found how people had different strategies for
example for different accounts. Recently, Bonneau et al. [9]
studied how people choose 4-digit PINs for banking cards.
Common strategies included birth dates and trivial patterns
based on the key displays. The reported presence of visual
strategies in the 4-digit case supports our hypothesis that
password generated with text input methods, too, may differ.
Researchers have studied how password creation policies
affect password security. Yan et al. [23] were among the first
to study empirically how different password policies affect
security and memorability of the passwords. They found that
mnemonic phrases as passwords were as easy to remember as
naive passwords. Later Kuo et al. [24] studied human-selection
of mnemonic phrases and found that their 400,000-entry dic-
tionary cracked 4% of mnemonic passwords; in comparison,
a standard dictionary with 1.2 million entries cracked 11% of
control passwords.
Popular websites (e.g. Google, Twitter) have adopted pass-
word meters as real-time measures of password strength for
users. Ur et al. [25] found that stringently rated password
meters led users to make significantly longer passwords that
included more digits, symbols, and uppercase letters, and
the passwords were also more resistant cracking algorithms.
However, Egelman et al. [26] showed that password meters do
not help much if people consider the accounts unimportant.
Another large-scale study on the effect of password policy
indicate that, given stronger password requirements to meet, al-
though users were annoyed, they also believe that they are now
more secure; in addition, use of dictionary words and names
are still the most common strategies to create passwords [27].
However, Weir et al. [28] claim that, passwords created under
common password requirements, such as minimum length and
different character set requirements, are still vulnerable to
cracking attacks, due to the fact that people tend to pick
the easiest passwords that meet the requirement. Mazurek
et al. [29] found when measuring password guessability for
an entire university that students affiliated with the computer
science school created 1.8 times stronger passwords than those
who were affiliated with the business school.
Recently, Houshmand et al. [30] implemented AMP, which
is a probabilistic cracking system for suggesting better pass-
words. Inglensant et al. [31] studied the costs for organizations
from unusable password policies. Brostoff et al. [32] predicted
that requests for password reminders could be reduced by up
to 44% by increasing the number of how many times users
can try their passwords before accounts get locked from three
to ten. Zviran et al. [33] looked at how password policies
influence people’s tendencies to write passwords down, finding
that e.g. commonly used passwords are not written down.
Chiasson et al. [34] conducted laboratory studies on how
people recall multiple text-based passwords compared to mul-
tiple click-based graphical passwords (PassPoints [35]). They
found that the recall rates after two weeks were not statistically
significant from each other. Fahl et al. [36] compared real
passwords to those generated in an experiment, finding that
about 30% of subjects do not behave as they do in real
life. However, the authors concluded that laboratory studies
generally create useful data.
Finally, few researchers have specifically look at helping
people to create passwords on non-traditional text entry meth-
ods. Schaub et al. [37] studied the usability and shoulder
surfing susceptibility of different smartphone platforms. Haque
et al. [38] have studied how to create better passwords on
mobile devices. Jakobsson et al. [39] proposed fastwords,
which relies on standard error-correcting features for users to
create passphrases. Mannan et al. [40] implemented ObPwd,
a tool for managing passwords on mobiles. The users choose
an object (e.g. picture), and ObPwd creates a corresponding
password that will be used on website automatically by the
ObPwd plugin.
III. METHOD
Our study randomly assigned participants into one control
group and two experiment groups. They were provided with a
different text entry method per group. Then they were asked to
created passwords for three different virtual accounts. Partici-
pants were told that they should generate as good passwords
as they normally would and their ability to recall them would
be tested later. They were asked to recall created passwords
immediately after a short distraction task, and to recall it again
after a time duration at least 10 days. To collect more data,
we used a mixed method approach: after producing passwords,
all participants filled a questionnaire about subjective workload
(NASA-TLX [41]) and answered interview questions about the
tasks they performed.
We conducted the study in a laboratory in order to control
for confounding factors. A controlled laboratory experiment
allows for choosing the main factors to be considered, in our
case the text entry method. Recently, a study by Fahl et al.
[36] indicates that lab studies provide for significantly more
helpful and realistic data compared to online studies.
Next, we describe our volunteer participants, our experi-
ment design, apparatus, measurement and data analyze meth-
ods.
A. Participants
We recruited participants through fliers, mailing lists, and
in person at cafeterias. Participants were required to be 18
years old or over and familiar with touchscreen devices. We
recruited 63 participants in total, between the ages of 18 to
65 (M = 27.2, SD = 9.9). Among all participants, 24 were
male and 39 were female. The educational background of
the participants during the study were: 22 had a high school
diploma, 23 had a Bachelor’s degree, 16 had a graduate degree
and two participants had other degrees. Participants had an
average of 3.44 years of experience with touchscreen devices,
and on average spent 3.70 hours a day using a touchscreen
device and 7.41 hours online per day.
All 63 participants completed session one of our study, and
57 of them returned and participated in session two as well.
As compensation, participants received $30 for completing the
whole study. They also participated in a raffle of three $75 gift
cards.
We recruited our participants in two batches, 33 in May
and 30 in June and July 2013. Between the beginning of the
recruiting batches there was a time gap of 70 days. Also, the
gap between the two sessions of the study varied. The mean
time gap for the first volunteers was 14.53 (SD = 5.81) days
and 29.52 (SD = 7.57) days for the second.
Our study was approved by the Institutional Review Board
of our institutions.
B. Experiment Design
The experiment followed a 3 x 3 mixed design: text
entry method type (3 levels) was controlled as a between-
subject variable and account type (3 levels) as a within-subjects
variable.
The first variable was the main variable we were interested:
the different types of text entry method. We divided our
participants into three groups based on this variable: control
group, experiment groups one and two. The comparison of
these three groups is the main focus in our analysis. The
participants were randomly assigned into one of these three
groups. The participants were unaware of the assignments
or that other groups existed. The detailed explanation for
the differences between the group setup is given in the next
subsection.
The main reason we designed this variable to be between-
group was to isolate its effect from any other undesired effects
such as any possible confounding factors that would correlate
with both the variable and the result. In contrast, a within-
subject design would not be appropriate. With a within-subject
design, we would ask each participant perform the same
creation task with all methods. This could introduce potential
random effects within each subject with respect to our main
variable, leading to inaccurate data.
We also included the type of virtual accounts as a within-
subject variable, to be nested within our between-group vari-
able. With this nested structure, we accomplished two things.
First, we increased the sample size, which ensured the power
of our experiment design. Second, this enabled us to study
any potential interaction effect of our main variable given the
context of different types of accounts.
We note that a similar design has been used before by
Chiasson et al. [34] to compare how generating multiple
passwords affect the ability to recall text-based and multiple
click-based graphical passwords (PassPoints [35]). Our work
differs from theirs in that they focused on analysis of recall
sessions, while we focused on password creation process
and password security. In particular, our recall session was
designed to motivate participants to create realistic passwords,
thus increasing ecological validity; our main focus was on
the passwords created in session one. In contrast, their work
focused on the recall rate collected from recall session. More-
over, we analyzed our result with also the account type variable
and its interaction between our main variable when applicable.
We also used TLX forms to estimate workload.
C. Apparatus
Our main experiment setup was defined by the apparatus
(text entry methods) each group used.
Control group
We provided a common laptop (Macbook Pro 2012 with
a 13” display) as the device used in the control group. We
chose this because the physical keyboard on a common laptop
is likely to be still the most common text entry method for
password creation. This laptop had a common physical qwerty
keyboard in English language.
Experiment group one
We provided a large tablet (Nexus 10 tablet with Android
4.2.2, 10.1” touchscreen) as the device used in experiment
group one. The keyboard on the tablet had the same layout and
usability as a common qwerty touchscreen keyboard. Given
that the tablet can be held in the hands in two ways, we asked
the participants to keep it in the “landscape” mode when using
it.
Experiment group two
We provided a regular-size smartphone (Galaxy Nexus
smartphone with Android 4.2.2, 4.5” touchscreen) as the de-
vice used in the experiment group two. The keyboard layout on
the smartphone was chosen from several available designs for
smartphone platforms. We had four layouts: lowercase letters
(first layout), digits and some special symbols (second layout),
uppercase letters (third layout) and more special symbols
(fourth layout), as the same as a common qwerty touchscreen
keyboard. If we define the reachability of each layout by the
number of key presses one needs to reach that layout from
the first layout, in a common qwerty touchscreen keyboard,
the reachability of the four layouts are 0 (pop up immediately
when activated), 1 (in most cases denoted as “123”), 1 (“Shift”
key) and 2 (one more press after reaching second layout),
respectively. However, we built our keyboard so that the our
layouts were ordered hierarchically and the reachability of
them became 0, 1, 2 and 3, respectively. In such way, one
has to reach the previous layout before reaching the next one.
Compared with the common design, our uppercase letters and
some special symbols are harder to reach.
The primary reason we chose our text entry methods as
described was to differentiate each group in their difficulty
of reaching keys during text entry. Method in group one was
more difficult to reach digits and symbols compared with that
of control group in that it did not include them in the first
layout; method in group two was more difficult than that of
group one was because (1). smaller screen to interact with,
(2). more switches between layouts for different types of keys.
Note all three apparatus still provided good usability.
The keyboard layout design of both group one and two are
demonstrated in Figure 1.
Software
We implemented two versions of applications that per-
formed the same task. The application for control group
was built with Flask, a Python micro-framework for web
development. The application for group one and two was built
with Java for Android. Both applications had the same two
features: password creation and password recall. In password
creation interface, they asked participants to create usernames
and passwords for three virtual accounts, including bank, email
and online magazine accounts, in the same order. Each virtual
account had a different logo, color and short description. In
recall interface, both applications asked participants to recall
what they created earlier for each account, in a different order,
which was determined by Latin square. A “Give up” button
would show up after 4 failed attempts for each account. Both
applications also provided corresponding toast notification
for situations such as incorrect password, empty username,
successfully recalled, etc.
D. Measurement
For all groups, we logged all our data into a local file stored
on the device. We collected username, password text and text
entry related data from every participant. Text entry related
data included every keystroke and switches between different
text entry fields. We also collected the exact timestamp for
all entry events. Subjective work load assessment scores were
collected using TLX forms.
E. Procedure
After recruitment, participants were randomly assigned to
our three groups separated based on text entry methods. The
number of participants for control group, group one and two
were 21, 27 and 15, respectively. All studies were conducted
in the same office room we setup for this study. Our study
consisted two sessions. We explain the procedure of each
session as below.
In session one, we asked participants to create a username
and a secure password for three different accounts using the
text entry methods we provided. Specifically, the participants
were instructed to create secure passwords, adding that the
passwords should be difficult for others to guess while still
easy for themselves to remember. They were also informed
not to re-use existing passwords. The participants were not
given any other instructions about security, and our apparatus
did not check any password composition policy. After creating
passwords, participants were asked to fill in a TLX form
[41] regarding the task and perform two distraction tasks
we provided, the mental rotation task [42], and a mental
countdown. Then, we asked the participants to try to recall
their usernames and passwords for the three accounts. The
order of the accounts was switched using 3 x 3 Latin square.
Then we asked a few survey questions and demographic
questions. The detailed procedures for the session one were
as follows:
1) Introduction to the Study. The participants were
introduced to the study, which included reading and
signing the consent form, discussion of their rights
as participants and how they would be compensated.
2) Password Creation. Each participant was given the
corresponding text entry method before the session.
They were asked to create usernames and passwords
for three different virtual accounts: bank, email and
online magazine. The order of the accounts was the
same for all participants at this step.
3) Subjective Workload Assessment The participants
were asked to fill out NASA TLX form.
4) Distraction. The participants were asked to do a
mental rotation task and count down from 20 to 0
in mind.
5) Password Recall. Participants were asked to recall
usernames and passwords they created in the Pass-
word Creation phase above. The order of the accounts
were changed with Latin square. Participants were
allowed to try as many time as they wanted, and if
they cannot remember their usernames or passwords,
they could press the “Give up” button (showed up
after four failed attempts) to proceed to the next
account.
6) Short Survey. The participants were asked some
questions about how did they create their passwords
and other thoughts about the study.
Fig. 1: The keyboard layout for the devices in group one and two. Note two groups share the same key positions within each
layout, but the structures of the four layouts are different: group one follows the common structure, while group two has a
hierarchical structure, that is, to reach the next layout one has to first reach the previous one.
7) Demographic questions. The participants were
asked usual demographics questions.
In session two of our study, which was at least 10 days
after session one, participants were asked to come back to
recall the usernames and passwords they created in session
one. The recall procedure was the same as the recall process
in session one. After recall process, participants were asked to
fill out NASA TLX form and answered a few questions in a
short survey.
F. Estimating password security
We estimated the security of our passwords quantita-
tively with several password security metrics: Shannon en-
tropy [12], [13], NIST entropy for human-selected pass-
words [14] and scores based on the adaptive password-strength
meter (APSM) [15].
Both Shannon entropy and NIST entropy are well-known
password strength estimators: entropy has been proposed to
be a measure of the randomness of passwords in bits. As
a measure of “uncertainty”, Shannon entropy has been used
in evaluating security of passwords in cryptographic con-
texts [14]. We used random entropy in our analysis, which
was defined as in equation H = L× log2N , in which L is the
length of the password, and N is the possible set of characters.
The NIST entropy is a scheme to evaluate human-
selected passwords introduced in NIST Electronic Authentica-
tion Guideline [14]. The scheme takes into account the fact that
passwords were chosen by human beings, who tend to choose
passwords that are easily guessed, and even from fairly small
dictionaries of a few thousand commonly chosen passwords.
According to the NIST guideline we implemented the scheme
by assigning different amount of entropy to characters at
different positions, each password creation rule contributing a
specific amount of entropy and that the entropy of the policy is
the sum of the entropy contributed by each rule. In addition, we
performed a simple dictionary word check to give the password
a bonus entropy if it did not contain checked dictionary word.
The dictionary we used here was “dic-0294”, which will be
described in later section.
The adaptive password-strength meter (APSM) based on
Markov Models is trying to estimate the strength of a password
by estimating the probability of the n-grams that compose
the password [15]. N-gram is a concept in natural language
processing: an n-gram is a contiguous sequence of n characters
from a given string. Probabilities of n-grams are computed
based on a large password dataset, therefore, it introduces
certain dependency on the training password dataset. In our
implementation, we used the “rockyou” password dataset to
compute the database of probabilities for every n-gram. Also,
we chose 4-gram as the element in our database, which was the
same as the original paper. The “rockyou” password dataset,
which would be explained in later section, contained over 32
million real passwords. The detailed implementation could be
found in the original paper.
There are some other metrics we did not include. Bonneau
et al. [43] has computed several statistical metrics for password
security. However their goal is mainly to estimate the password
security in the context of a large password dataset (about 70
millions in the literature). Therefore, their metrics did not fit
well in our scenario with a small set of data. The guess-number
calculator proposed by Kelley et al. [44] is trying to predict the
number of guesses a cracking algorithm needed to compromise
a given password, instead of actually cracking it. Given there
lacks of a comprehensive evaluation for the predictor, it is
difficult to repeat the work exactly. However, instead of ap-
plying the metric directly, we used one of mentioned cracking
setup from the work in our actual cracking attacks. The chosen
experiment was claimed to simulate an attack with across to
a broad variety of publicly available data [44]. Therefore, we
expected it to be a comprehensive attack to reveal vulnerability
in our passwords. More detailed description of the setup could
be found in the following subsection.
G. Password Cracking attacks
We performed several actual cracking attacks against our
passwords to gain more insights beyond password security
metrics. The attacks included: a plain dictionary attack with
different types of dictionaries, and two long session offline
attacks inspired by previous work [28], [44]. As Bonneau et
al. [45] indicated, the result of cracking attacks also suffered
from a lack of comparability and repeatability. Therefore, our
goal was to discover both the same and the differences in
resistance against attacks for different groups of passwords in
general. In our attacks, we used two popular password cracking
tools, John the Ripper [46] and hashcat [47]. We described
our collection of dictionaries, and the setup of our attacks as
follows.
Dictionaries
We used various dictionaries that are common in previ-
ous work. “dic-0294” was a commonly used English dictio-
nary [48]. “all” and “mangled” dictionaries were free and paid
dictionaries from openwall website1. “all” contained words
chosen by openwall from 21 different languages plus a list
of frequently used passwords, and “mangled” was a hand-
tuned wordlist containing nearly 4 million password candidates
with different mangle rules applied to various dictionaries
from openwall. “rockyou” dictionary included about 32 million
passwords leaked from the game website RockYou. “facebook”
was a full list of names of search-able user from the social
network website Facebook [49]. For each name “facebook”
had four formats: first name, last name, the first name plus last
initial, and first initial plus last name. “myspace” contained
passwords from a phishing attack against MySpace website.
“inflection”2 was a list of words along with their different
grammatical forms such as plurals and past tense.
Dictionary attack
First, we applied a plain dictionary attack with different
combinations of our dictionaries. A plain dictionary attack
involves simply comparing each word/password from the dic-
tionary to the target password in hashed format and see if
they are the same. The performance of a plain dictionary
attack relies heavily on the relevancy of the dictionary and
the target passwords. We classified mentioned dictionaries into
three types. The first attack with “Words”, which contained
common words from different languages, aimed at easy pass-
words which only had single dictionary word; the second
with “Facebook”, contained the entire directories from the
1http://www.openwall.com/wordlists/
2http://wordlist.sourceforge.net
website, aimed at passwords made with actual names of people
or organizations, and popular phrases; the third attack with
“Passwords”, which contained common passwords and real
leaked passwords, aimed at compromising common and naive
passwords.
Long session offline attack
We also applied two long session offline attacks on our
passwords.
The first attack involved generating guesses based on an
modified “Single mode” mangle rules, which originally from
John the Ripper, with the “dic-0294” dictionary as input. The
“Single mode” rules set contained a set of rules to modify
words including login names and home directory to generate
a large size of guesses [46]. The modified version, made by
Weir [50], was said to be optimized for English dictionary. We
followed the experiment setup in [28].
The second attack applied an advanced password crack
algorithm: the state-of-art probability password crack tool
developed by Weir et al. [28], [51]. The tool generated
password guesses in the order determined by various rules in
structures, characters, digits and symbols. The tool needed to
be trained in advance for developing the model of probability,
then one could apply the model to a given dictionary to
generate guesses. We used a similar model from experiment
P4 conducted by Kelley et al. [44]. Note though while the
experiment from the original work was an estimation of
number of guesses against each target password, we actually
generated those guesses against our passwords.
The detailed setup of our second attack is as follows:
1) using passwords with length longer than 8 from
“myspace”, “all” and “mangled” dictionaries to train
the probabilities of character-type structures;
2) using “myspace”, “all”, “mangled” and “rockyou”
dictionaries to train the probabilities of digits and
symbols in passwords;
3) finally using “myspace”, “dic-0294”, “inflection”,
“rockyou”, “all” and “mangled” dictionaries as input
strings.
The number of guesses generated in two attacks were
1000M and 20000M respectively. We chose so to simulate one
quick attack with easy-to-find resource while another longer
attack with optimal strategies and more resources.
H. Statistical models
Here we described the assumptions and statistical models
we used in our analysis. We assumed the data we collected
from each text entry method group came from normal distri-
bution, which enabled us to apply classic statistical models.
The reason we held this assumption because all our groups
had a large enough sample size (> 30 per group), indicating
they were representative for each population. In cases where
required assumptions could not be met, we used corresponding
robust methods. Note our hypothesis was on the effect of text
entry methods, therefore our main focus was the text entry
method variable.
For analysis of categorical dependent variables, we used
Pearson’s chi-square test. The Pearson’s chi-square test is
used to examine the null hypothesis that the distribution of
frequencies one observed in certain samples is consistent with
the targeted distribution [52]. Pearson’s chi-square test assumes
minimum expected frequency in the testing categorical data is
larger than 5. There were cases where this assumption could
not be held. In such cases we used Fisher’s exact test [53],
which is the robust equivalent of chi-square test. Since given
categorical tests does not compatible with repeated measure
variables [54], we did not include account type variable in
such tests.
For analysis of continuous dependent variables, we applied
chi-square tests on multilevel models. Multilevel model (or
mixed model) is a generalization of linear regression model.
It compares the effect of several variables on the group
mean of data, allowing data from participants to be organized
at more than one level [55], or one variable nested within
another, which fits in our experiment setup. For each dependent
variable, we constructed different multilevel models by adding
one variable at a time. We also constructed a model with
interaction effect of our two variables. Then we compared the
fit of these models to our data using chi-square fit test. If
the result showed significant difference between two models,
which should differ by whether having one particular variable
or not, then we concluded that variable had significant effect
on the dependent variable. Such models also enabled us to
look at pair-wise comparisons within one model to gain more
insights, given we have three levels in both two variables.
For analysis of several correlated dependent variables, we
applied the multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA).
MANOVA is a generalized form of univariate analysis of
variance (ANOVA) and is used when there are two or more de-
pendent variables [56]. In our analysis, we used the MANOVA
with the Pillai-Bartlett trace as the statistic [54]. Note for
all significance tests performed, we chose p = 0.05 as the
threshold for a statistically significant result.
IV. RESULTS
In total we have collected 189 passwords from 63 par-
ticipants. In this section we begin with a basic analysis on
password structures and probability of individual key appeared
in a password, then proceed to the analysis using standard and
recent password strength metrics, the result of our password
cracking attacks, and the analysis of TLX data. Throughout the
section, we mostly focus on the effect of different text entry
methods to password security.
A. Structures
Table I shows the length of the generated passwords and
also the amount of characters of different types per password
across groups. The result demonstrates a notable difference in
password length and amount of lowercase characters between
group two and other two groups.
We fitted different multilevel models take into account dif-
ferent variables, and then tested if any variable had significant
effect to the fit of the model by conducting chi-square test.
Our variables were text entry method (3 levels) and account
type (3 levels). The same set of models was applied to listed
dependent variables separately. The result is shown in Table II.
It shows only account type variable has a significant main
Metric Control
group
Group one Group two
Length (mean) 10.13 10.05 12.27
Lowercase letters 6.19 6.37 8.40
Digits 2.59 2.31 1.67
Uppercase letters 0.75 0.78 1.22
Special symbols 0.32 0.30 0.49
TABLE I: The mean of password length, amount of characters
of different types per password across groups.
effect on the number of digit appeared in single password
across groups (χ2(2) = 10.98, p = 0.0041). The text entry
method variable has an effect very close to significant on the
number of lowercase letters across groups (χ2(2) = 5.92,
p = 0.052).
Metric Variable χ2(2) p
Length
text entry method type 1.47 0.49
account type 2.49 0.29
interaction 4.12 0.39
Lowercase letters
text entry method type 5.92 0.052*
account type 5.14 0.08
interaction 5.55 0.24
Digit
text entry method type 2.75 0.25
account type 10.98 0.0041*
interaction 3.97 0.41
Uppercase
text entry method type 0.89 0.64
account type 2.08 0.35
interaction 7.20 0.13
Special symbol
text entry method type 0.24 0.89
account type 5.19 0.07
interaction 3.58 0.47
TABLE II: Result of chi-square fit test on multilevel models
for amount of characters of each type per password. Variables
in the model were text entry method type and account type.
The term “interaction” stands for the interaction effect between
the two factors.
We then further examined the effect of text entry methods
on amount of lowercase letters by setting up planned contrasts.
The contrasts looked for differences in the amount of lowercase
letters of a password between control group and group one,
b = 0.43, t(60) = 0.45, p = 0.65, r = 0.058, and control
group and group two, b = 3.35, t(60) = 2.99, p = 0.004, r =
0.36. This result shows a significant effect of our variable on
the amount of lowercase letters between control group and
group two. Specifically, passwords created from group two
had significantly more lowercase letters than that from control
group.
Next, we examine the categories of passwords each group
generated. We defined the category of a password by types of
characters it contained. The category of a password reveals the
complexity in its structures: a password containing only one
type of characters has a much simpler structure than one with
several different types of characters. Table III summarizes our
definition of categories.
Figure 2 demonstrates the distribution of passwords in
defined categories across groups of passwords. According to
the figure, the most common category for passwords from both
control group (30.2%) and group one (38.2%) are passwords
Category Description
loweralphanum only contains lowercase letters and dig-
its
loweralpha only contains lowercase letters
mixedalphanum contains lowercase and uppercase let-
ters and digits
loweralphaspecialnum contains lowercase letters, special sym-
bols and digits
all contains lowercase and uppercase let-
ters, special symbols and digits
mixedalpha only contains lowercase and uppercase
letters
others types other than mentioned ones
TABLE III: Definition of each category of passwords. All types
with very low occurrence in our passwords were aggregated
into “others” category.
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Fig. 2: A comparison of distribution of passwords in different
categories for each group.
contain only lowercase letters and digits (loweralphanum),
while that for group two is passwords contain only lowercase
letters (loweralpha) (31.1%). In addition, while other two
groups both have a certain amount of passwords contain lower-
case letters, special symbols and digits (loweralphspecialnum),
group two does not have passwords in that category at all.
To quantify the difference of the overall distribution across
groups, we applied Fisher’s exact test with text entry method
as variable, given our data did not meet the minimum expected
frequency. The result, (p = 0.048, FET ), shows a significant
effect of text entry method over the frequency distribution of
our passwords in mentioned categories.
B. Probability of keys appeared in passwords
Previous subsection indicates a significant difference in the
amount of lowercase keys across groups. To examine more
detailed difference among keys in our passwords, we analyzed
the probability of each key appeared in a password for our
data. The probability of a key within one group is defined
as the number of passwords contained the key over the total
number of passwords created by that group. We also included
the comparison between keys with different reachability. As
mentioned previously, reachability of a key is defined as how
many key presses one needs to reach that key from the first
layout. For keys from a keyboard, the value of reachability
depends on which layout they are in. For example in our
designs, the same key “A”, is in the second layout in control
group and group one, but in the third layout in group two.
Figure 3 demonstrates the result.
The figure shows that when we use control group as
baseline group, the nonlinear fitted lines of three groups do not
differ much. However we find that probabilities of the same
across groups are quite different. For most of keys, its proba-
bilities of group one and group two “oscillate” around that of
control group. Such “oscillation” canceled low probabilities
and high probabilities with each other for the experimental
groups in some degree. To compare, when we use experimental
groups as baseline group, the difference in the fitted lines
becomes visible, especially with group two as baseline group:
in both the middle and bottom graph, the probabilities of
lowercase keys of group two are more “skewed” than that of
other two groups; also, the probabilities of digits and most
symbol keys of group two are visibly lower than that of other
two groups. This suggests people from group two created
passwords had a preference over a small subset of lowercase
keys compared with other groups. We explained this result in
more detail later in discussion.
C. Password security by quantitative metrics
Next, we analyzed our passwords with two standard and
a recent password security metrics. For each password, we
computed random entropy, NIST entropy and score computed
using adaptive password-strength mater based on Markov
model (APSM). The mean scores and corresponding confi-
dence intervals of the result are shown in Figure 4. According
to the graph, scores of passwords of group two are consistently
higher than that of other two groups. However, most of means
stay within the confidence interval of the value of other groups,
indicating the differences among groups are limited.
To quantify the difference, we fitted different multilevel
models take into account different variables, and then tested
if any variable had significant effect to the fit of the model
by conducting chi-square test. Our variables were text entry
method (3 levels) and account type (3 levels). The same
set of models was applied to listed dependent variables sep-
arately. We present the result in Table IV. It shows that
the text entry method type did not have significant main or
interaction effect on any of our metrics. The account type
variable, on the other hand, has significant main effect on
NIST entropy (χ2(2) = 7.12, p = 0.0284) and the scores
from APSM (χ2(2) = 8, 49, p = 0.0143). However, the
pair-wise effect size of account type variable on both scores
from APSM (rbank,email = 0.07, rbank,magazine = 0.16) and
NIST entropy (rbank,email = 0.04, rbank,magazine = 0.1)
were quite small. Therefore, in the scope of our data and
these password metrics, different groups did not demonstrate
significant difference. However, we threw reasonable doubt
on the validity and comprehensiveness of those metrics as
password security measurement, which was proved by the
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Fig. 3: The probabilities of keys across groups. Three graphs display the same set of data but use different group as baseline
group: control group (top), group one (middle), group two (bottom). In each graph, probability of each key across groups are
plotted as dots. Vertical lines indicate the order of layouts (first, second, etc) based on that of baseline group. Within each layout,
the order of keys on x axis is ranked by probability of each key from the corresponding baseline group Curve lines in each
graph represents a non-linear fit to data of each group.
result of our cracking attacks. Detailed explanation could be
found in discussion section.
Metric Variable χ2(2) p
Random entropy
text entry method type 1.88 0.39
account type 2.20 0.33
interaction 4.09 0.39
NIST entropy
text entry method type 1.19 0.55
account type 7.12 0.03*
interaction 1.26 0.87
Scores of APSM
text entry method type 1.33 0.51
account type 8.49 0.01*
interaction 2.78 0.60
TABLE IV: Result of chi-square fit test on multilevel models
applied on three security metrics. Variables in the model
were text entry method type and account type. The term
“interaction” stands for the interaction effect between terminal
type and account type.
D. Cracking attacks
In this section, we present the results of comprehensive
cracking attacks performed against our password dataset. Ta-
ble V shows the result of plain dictionary attacks. The perfor-
mance of “Words” and “Facebook” attack was very limited
across all groups, except “Facebook” attack on passwords
from group two. The “Password” attack worked much better
compared with first two attacks against control group and
group one, while had very limited improvement against group
two.
The results of two long session offline attacks are shown
in the Figure 5 and Figure 6, respectively. According to the
figures, although the lowerbounds of resistance (the number
of guesses of the first cracked password) are different, the
percentages of cracked passwords across groups show similar
patterns compared with each other. One exception is a dis-
tinctive spike of the percentage of cracked passwords in the
second attack against group two between the range of 1M (106)
to 100M (108) in number of guesses.
Name Include Size Control group (63) Group one (81) Group two (45)
Words “dic-0294”, “all”, “inflection” 4.1M 4 (6.3%) 4 (4.9%) 4 (8.9%)
Facebook “facebook” 37.3M 3 (4.8%) 6 (7.4%) 7 (15.6%)
Passwords “mangled”, “rockyou” 54.8M 15 (23.8%) 12 (14.8%) 8 (17.8%)
TABLE V: Results of plain dictionary attack with different dictionaries. “Include” included all dictionaries we used in each
attack. The size is the number of unique entries each combined dictionary has.
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Fig. 4: The mean score of three password security metrics
across groups. They are: random entropy (upper left), NIST
entropy (bottom left) and score from Adaptive Password-
strength meter (APSM) (upper right). The error bar indicates
95% confidence interval.
Fig. 5: The percentage of passwords cracked by our first
offline attack. The x axis is in in log scale. The final percentage
of cracked passwords for control group, group one and group
two are 14.2%, 17.3% and 15.6%, respectively.
Fig. 6: The percentage of passwords cracked by Weir et
al.’s algorithm vs. the number of guess, per group. The final
percentage of cracked passwords for control group, group one
and group two are 31.7%, 33.3% and 28.4%, respectively.
When we combine cracked passwords from all attacks
together, the total number of cracked passwords for control
group, group one and group two are 24 (38.1%), 24 (29.6%)
and 16 (35.6%). Figure 7 shows the distribution of all cracked
passwords into different categories across groups, in which we
see quite different percentages in different categories across
groups. Particularly, the category with the largest percentage
of cracked passwords is different for all three groups: mixedal-
phanum (passwords contain uppercase letters, lowercase letters
and digits) (10, 15.9%), loweralphanum (13, 16.0%) and
loweralpha (7, 15.6%) for control group, group one and two,
respectively.
To see the result of whether or not a password would be
cracked by our cracking attacks was different across groups
based on our data, we applied chi-square test on the number of
cracked passwords across groups. The result shows it is likely
that the types of text entry method do not have any significant
effect on whether or not a password would be cracked by our
attacks, (χ2(2) = 1.2, p = 0.55).
In addition, we applied categorical test to see if there exists
any significant effect of text entry method variable on the
distribution of cracked passwords in different categories across
groups. We applied Fisher’s exact test, given that the data did
not meet the minimum expected frequency. The result shows
that a significant effect exists (p = 0.031, FET). Therefore, it
is highly likely that the same set of attacks we performed has
different effect on passwords created using different text entry
methods.
Task load
In each session we asked participants to fill out the TLX
form. We use TLX forms to evaluate the complexity of tasks
we designed. These questions revealed participants’ subjective
others
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Fig. 7: A comparison of percentages of cracked passwords
in different categories across groups. Cracked passwords here
included passwords compromised from all our attacks.
assessment towards tasks in the study, which we summarize
below. Figure 8 shows the mean scores for each question of
TLX form for both session one and two.
Given items in TLX form were correlated, we applied
MANOVA test with the text entry method as variable on the
six items together, for session one and two, respectively. The
result indicated a non-significant effect of text entry method
type on the scores of TLX assessment both for session one,
V = 0.21, F (8, 116) = 1.70, p = 0.11, and session two,
V = 0.28, F (12, 100) = 1.37, p = 0.19. Therefore, we
concluded that it was highly likely participants in groups
did not feel different about the subjective task load of the
experiment they participated in. This demonstrates our choice
of text entry methods provided similar usability across groups.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our main findings show that text entry methods affect the
security of passwords.
Text Entry Method Affects Password Security. The
structures of passwords created using different text entry
methods showed statistically significant differences. This was
revealed by the distribution of passwords in different categories
across groups p = 0.048, FET). According to Figure 2, more
than half of passwords created from group one (∼54%) and
two (∼57%) were in categories loweralphanum and loweral-
pha. This in contrast to the control group, which had only
39% in the same categories. In particular, when we looked
at the percentages of passwords in loweralpha, the simplest
category, we found that 31% of passwords in group two was
in this category. The control group had only 9.5% in the
same category. This is emphasized by the significant effect
(p = 0.04) of text entry method variable had on the amount of
lowercase letters per password between the control group and
group two.
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Fig. 8: Mean score for each item in TLX form in session one
and two. The error bar stands for 95% confidence intervals
based on a bootstrap (i.e. not assuming normality).
Our analysis of structures was followed by the analysis
of individual keys present in passwords. Figure 3 shows the
different probabilities of each key in our passwords across
groups. The most important finding from this figure is how
probabilities of keys become more skewed and squeezed as the
difficulty of reaching keys in the text entry method increases.
The difference is most visible in the third graph of the figure,
when the group two is the baseline group, as shown by the
fitted lines of groups. In the graph, most of keys before “w”
have a higher probability appearing in passwords from group
two, while ones after “w” have lower probability compared
with other two groups. This suggests that people from group
two tended to focus on a small subset of lowercase keys when
they composed their passwords. In contrast, participants in the
other groups chose a broader range of lowercase keys. This
also holds for uppercase keys: some uppercase keys had higher
probabilities to appear in group two, while other uppercase
keys had low or even zero probability. In addition, most digit
and symbol keys had low or zero probability of appearing in
passwords generated by group two.
We also found that the passwords showed different re-
sistance against cracking attacks. Recall, we categorized the
generated passwords to several categories, including “only
contains lowercase letters and digits”, “contains lowercase and
uppercase letters and digits”, etc. Within these categories,
the distribution of the cracked passwords was significantly
different (p = 0.031, FET). In particular, the category with
the largest percentage of cracked passwords was distinct for
all three groups. Since our passwords represent the population
which we drew samples from, the same type of vulnerability
exists in the population, too. This means that if attackers would
know the text entry method used to create the passwords,
the corresponding vulnerability could be easily exploited by
their attacks. As an example, see Figure 6. When the number
of guesses is between 1M (106) to 100M (108), there is
an unusual spike that exists only in group two’s cracked
passwords. By examining cracked passwords, we find this is
precisely the vulnerability of group two: all cracked passwords
in the range are in the loweralpha category. We already showed
that group two’s passwords had significantly more lowercase
letters, and participants in this group focused on a small set
of lowercase keys when they composed their passwords.
Entropy and Markov Model Based Metrics. There is a
contradiction when we compare the results from computing
quantitative security metrics to the cracking attacks. In par-
ticular, the result of statistical tests on all three quantitative
password security metrics were non-significant, yet by issuing
cracking attacks we found considerable differences in resis-
tance against cracking attacks across groups. Such difference
mostly due to the fact that most quantitative metrics estimate
password security by a single value. Using such metrics, two
very similar passwords could result in quite different “score”
in security. For example, “vowelword” and “bonsjones” were
both lowercase-only letters consisted of two English words;
however, using APSM, their scores are 50 bits and 30 bits,
respectively. Considering the mean score of APSM for our
passwords overall are only 40 bits, a difference of 20 bits
would be very significant. Yet, one could see little difference
between passwords themselves. Therefore, values computed
using quantitative metrics could be misleading and should be
carefully interpreted, or accompanied with alternative analysis
such as analysis of password cracking attacks. Our findings
confirm previous recent studies [28], [45] that question using
entropy-based metrics to evaluate password security. Our study
also indicates that APSM might need to be also reconsidered
in particular for small-scale password datasets.
Guidelines for Designing Text Entry Methods for
Password Creation. Based on our results, we can introduce
guidelines for the design of text entry methods. The fact that
experimental groups utilized characters other than lowercase
letters less than the control group indicates that the easier
access to other characters could be important for users to
generate more diverse passwords. Therefore, a simple design
modification could be including digits or some special symbols
in the first layout of the keyboard, in order to encourage
people to choose them over lowercase letters. This is especially
important for keyboards on platforms with small input areas,
such as smartphones, as our study showed the large amount
of loweralpha passwords created by them.
However, more diverse passwords do not directly equal to
better security, as indicated by our password cracking results.
Many diverse passwords generated in the control group were
passwords consisting of simple words modified with simple
mangling rules,. These passwords were vulnerable to cracking
attacks. Therefore, automatically detecting naive mangling
rules would be desirable when generating password. We be-
lieve such system is quite feasible practically if it only focuses
a few very simple mangling rules, for example, capitalized first
letters or appending of a single digit.
Limitations. A recent study by Fahl et al. [36] compared
real passwords to those generated in an experiment, finding that
about 30% of their subjects did not behave as they do in real
life. However, the authors concluded that laboratory studies
generally create useful data. We used a random assignment
of subjects to the three terminal conditions, the contribution
of such users to the dataset should be even. Our study also
included a recall session after at least 10 days had passed for
encouraging participants to create realistic passwords.
Conclusions. We have presented a comprehensive analysis
of passwords created with different text entry methods. Al-
though we have shown that an effect of text entry methods
does exist, more work is needed to understand how and why
the different features of the text entry methods contribute
to password security. Is it possible to design a method for
password entry that specifically encourages users to enter
stronger passwords? Moreover, are there text entry methods
that are significantly worse in this respect and should not be
permitted at all?
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